Social Security and employer plans, and creating a retirement plan. Many analysts measure success of DC plans in precisely this way, by comparing actual participant behavior with what a good financial planner might recommend or do. For example, determining the adequacy of one's current savings rate is a critical financial planning task. Accordingly, in its annual survey of retirement readiness, the Employee Benefits Research Institute asks Americans whether they have calculate their retirement savings goal (EBRI, 2002) . In the 2002 survey only, 32 percent had, and this was down from 39 percent in 2001.
Being well-informed about retirement plan design and investments is also an important characteristic of a financial planner. Education is therefore a cornerstone of the defined contribution plan services offered to employers; it is also a focus of public policy at the Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and now the new Office of Financial Education within the US Treasury. 1 To gauge progress along these lines, several wellpublicized industry and academic studies surveys have documented the gap between what participants actually know and what a well-trained financial planner might know. For example, in terms of retirement benefit information, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) report that "misinformation or lack of information about retirement benefits is the norm" among individuals near retirement. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch (2002) reports that 54 percent of Americans over 30 think that a 401(k) plan is guaranteed, and this was also true of those expecting to rely on a 401(k) plan for retirement income. In terms of investment knowledge, Vanguard (2002a) and Merrill (2002) report that sizeable groups have no clear expectation of future stock market returns, or expect annual returns in excess of 20 percent. Also Vanguard (2002a) and John
Hancock (2001) report that the typical participant rates his or her own company stock as safer than a diversified stock fund. These reports attract headlines because they underscore the difference between the "planner model" and real-world participants.
It should be no surprise that all workers do not all conform to the planner model. Even a casual survey would suggest that individuals appear to differ markedly in their interest in money and retirement planning. Some individuals are saving and planning enthusiasts, motivated and excited about learning about whatever they need to know needed to make them successful in retirement. Others are indifferent or averse to saving, money matters, and discussion of retirement finances. The idea of heterogeneous saving preferences is, of course not, new. In classical literature, the idea surfaces in Aesop's Fables, where an ant works ceaselessly to gather corn for the winter, while a grasshopper pursues a life of leisure. In 1834, the economist John
Rae attempted to explain a country's wealth in terms of its "effective desire for accumulation." 2 In his Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall (1920) spoke of heterogeneous savings preferences not among countries, but among individuals:
One will reckon a distant benefit at nearly the same value which it would have for him if it were present; while another who has less power of realizing the future, less patience and self-control, will care comparatively little for any benefit that is not near at hand.
Arthur Pigou wrote about the tendency of human beings to discount the future, but he could have just as well been describing the grasshopper's dilemma: "our telescopic faculty is defective, and we, therefore, see future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale." 3 More recently, Laibson (1994 , 1997 and others have utilized hyperbolic discounting models to explain people's tendency to overvalue the present and undervalue the future.
This chapter attempts to apply this broad observation-that individuals have heterogeneous savings preferences-to the world of designing participant-directed retirement savings plans. Specifically, we examine how individual workers' attitudes vary towards the topics or interests thought to be necessary for optimal behavior in defined contribution plans, including issues as saving for the future, taking equity market risk, and creating a retirement plan. We segment workers participating in or eligible for an employer-sponsored DC plan into five "money attitude" clusters: groupings of similar attitudes and expectations regarding various aspects of financial and retirement management. What we find, not surprisingly, is that people differ substantially in their enthusiasm for the types of planning activities needed to be successful in conventional DC plans. In other words, not all workers are planners; rather, they come in many attitudinal "sizes."
Prior Research
Much of the existing economics literature explaining saving behavior in DC retirement plans focuses on how saving rates vary according to employer-provided incentives and participant demographics. 4 Researchers have found a positive statistical relationship between 401(k) plan participation and employer matching contributions, though there is some debate as to whether it is the mere presence or the actual magnitude of the match that matters more. 5 Plan saving rates have also been analyzed in terms of the demographic variables-income and ageat the heart of the neoclassical model of saving (i.e., that higher-income and/or older workers save more). Various researchers have also linked saving behavior to sex, race, education, job tenure, home ownership, and the presence of another retirement plan in the workplace.
Employer plan design is also thought to influence employee savings behavior-most notably the presence of 401(k) loans 6 and workplace education. In terms of education, Bernheim and Garrett (1996) , Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (1996) and Lusardi (this volume) report that education raises both participation and savings rates. Active use of financial training programs appears to boost participation rates and saving rates more than merely making information available. Education has its greatest impact among low-and middle-income households, probably because upper-income households are constrained by Internal Revenue Service contribution limits in their ability to boost saving. Of course, while education may successfully boost plan saving rates, this is distinct from saying that participants are well-educated about retirement plan decisions, given the results of the surveys cited in our introduction.
More recent research has sought to examine the non-economic or psychological factors that influence savings decisions. One notion is the importance of plan design "framing" effects, in which design choices by the sponsor influence participant decisions. Madrian and Shea (2001) report that automatic enrollment (in which newly eligible employees are enrolled at a default savings rate and in a default investment option) raises participation rates dramatically. It also eliminates differences in participation rates due to income, age, job tenure, sex, and race.
Yet this research raises a provocative question-why does a saving decision framed in negative terms yield such dramatically different results than one framed in positive terms? The workeras-planner would not be expected to vary saving behavior depending on how the question is asked by the employer. Choi et al. (2002a Choi et al. ( , 2002b document the role that inertia plays in automatic enrollment and in plan decisions generally. Not only do many participants exhibit inertia when automatically enrolled by staying at low default savings rates and in conservative default investment options; but also some participants who would have saved more or would have chosen different options decide to accept the default choices made for them. Perhaps if participants were fully rational agents with well-formed preferences, their choices would not be as easily swayed by the default options established by their employer.
In the same vein, inertia can be used to induce participants to save more, especially when they would otherwise be reluctant to do so. Under the "Save More Tomorrow" (or SMarT) plan, by Thaler and Benartzi (forthcoming), workers agree to have their plan contributions increased regularly in the future (e.g., by 1 percent a year on their anniversary). They found that workers in one firm were more willing to use the SMarT feature than to agree to a one-time increase in saving rate recommended by a financial planner. Over time, these workers ended up saving more than the planner had originally recommended. In this way, higher saving was produced by a combination of a technique in which painful savings decisions were postponed into the future, and inertia thereafter. 
Data and Methodology
The goal of present is to understand how attitudinal perceptions toward "money" and, more specifically, "retirement planning," are linked to behavior around plan participation or nonparticipation, as well as participant equity holdings and account activity. Our current research, like the EBRI study before it, develops an attitudinal segmentation of retirement plan participants and eligible non-participants. Importantly, however, we augment our survey results with administrative records on saving behavior (including plan eligibility and plan participation), and account behavior (including equity investment holdings, the level of account interaction, and the use of loans). In this way, our findings are linked not only to psychological attitudes expressed in the survey portion of the study, but also to actual participant behavior. The analysis had in two phases: a qualitative phase, in which structured interviews were used to elicit possible attitudes regarding "money" and "retirement planning" from a small group of workers; and a quantitative phase, in which a much larger sample population was asked to respond to a battery of attitudinal statements regarding money and retirement planning. advice, and education they used to make decisions. The interviews closed with some creative imagery around planning for retirement, the future, retirement and savings. 8 A panel of observers was trained to take verbatim notes, which were used as input to the subsequent design of a questionnaire in the quantitative phase.
Following the interviews, a team of researchers synthesized the interview notes, from which three patterns emerged. One group of interviewees clearly had a strong interest and orientation toward money management and retirement planning: this group was tentatively named "planners" by the research team. A second set of interviewees seemed uninterested in money issues or retirement planning: these were given the name "avoiders." And a third set of interviewees seemed somewhere in between: diligent and motivated about saving for the future, often out of a sense of responsibility for others, but at the same time, not particularly interested in retirement planning or financial matters per se. This third group the team referred to as the "doers": individuals who "did what they're supposed to" in terms of saving for the future (or for others).
An important output from the qualitative phase was a battery of 48 potential attitude statements that could be used to describe the feelings, emotions, and attitudes expressed by the interviewees regarding money and retirement planning.
Quantitative/Survey Phase. During the quantitative phase, we sought to verify the existence of distinct attitudinal segments in the population, quantify what portion of the retirement plan population they represented, and investigate differences that might emerge in terms of attitudes, behavioral variables (e.g., participation rate, equity allocation, account usage), and demographic variables. A questionnaire was designed to incorporate a series of attitudinal statements drawn from the interviews, and this survey was administered via telephone in 2000. A total of 1,141
respondents participated in the telephone survey, which averaged 20 minutes in length.
Respondents were a random sample drawn from a universe of participants and eligible nonparticipants among Vanguard recordkeeping plans. Participation and eligibility status was drawn from our administrative systems, not from the survey respondents. A summary of respondent's demographics can be founded in Table 1 .
Table 1 here
The survey included a variety of demographic, behavioral, and usage questions to reveal the types of information that respondents relied on when making financial decisions. After the survey, we added additional administrative data, including asset allocation to equities, transaction activity, "channel utilization" (the frequency of retirement plan transactions, whether via a telephone associate, an automated voice response unit, or the internet), and loan activity.
Survey attitudinal responses were then analyzed using a statistical procedure known as "cluster analysis." Cluster analysis is a multivariate statistical technique designed to group objects (in this case, retirement plan participants and eligible non-participants) based on similar characteristics (their responses to the 26 attitudinal questions). The statistical technique defines a cluster or segment in such a way as to minimize differences among individual members within a cluster, while maximizing the differences across the clusters. In effect, it is a way of determining natural groupings within a data set, although researchers can influence these groupings by the statistical methods employed.
Cluster solutions were generated using an iterative, non-hierarchical k-means clustering procedure. 9 For further analysis, we selected a five-segment clustering solution, chosen because it was easy to understand and communicate. Each cluster also represented a reasonably large subsegment of the retirement plan population, with the smallest segment accounting for 14 percent of the population and the largest for 26 percent. Finally, each cluster was given a name designed to evoke its attitudinal preferences. Table 2 provides a list of the 26 attitudinal statements used in the survey, as well as the corresponding mean scores for respondents in each cluster of the five "money attitude" clusters. Table 3 summarizes key features of each cluster, while Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the size of each attitudinal segment. About one-fifth (21 percent) of the retirement plan population (participants and eligible non-participants) may be characterized as Successful Planners. These individuals have a strong, goal-oriented vision of a successful retirement. They enjoy planning for the future and are optimistic that they are well-prepared for retirement. They are disciplined savers, and they derive a high level of personal satisfaction from the act of saving for the future.
Results: The Five "Money Attitudes" Segments
They are comfortable with equity risk-taking, and they rely on an extensive array of information sources to make decisions. Table 2 have a strong view of their retirement goals. In fact, they appear to be more willing to adjust their lifestyle to available resources rather than pursue a given set of goals with discipline.
The fourth segment is the Stressed Avoiders, which accounted one-fifth (19 percent) of the retirement plan population. Stressed Avoiders find financial matters to be a source of stress, anxiety, and confusion-all of which combine to create obstacles to planning a successful financial future. They do not appear to be particularly goal-oriented in thinking about the future.
Worry, concern, stress, and pessimism are the emotions which most often surface when they confront financial issues. Of all of the segments, this group is least confident in its investing skills.
The final segment is the Live-for-Today Avoiders, which represented 14 percent of the retirement plan population. This group is not necessarily overwhelmed by the emotional aspects of money and retirement planning, but instead is uninterested in the future at all. Since they live for the present, they derive little or no satisfaction from saving for the future; leisure time is more valuable than any time spent on planning efforts.
Demographic and Behavioral Characteristics. Besides differing in attitudes, the segments also differ in terms of certain demographic and behavioral characteristics (see Table 4 ). Plan participation rates, our primary metric of saving behavior, varied significantly across four of the five groups-from a high of 90 percent for Successful Planners to a low of 62 percent for Stressed Avoiders. (Participation rates for the two groups of Avoiders, at 62 percent for Stressed Avoiders and 64 percent for Live-for-Today Avoiders, were not statistically significantly different.) At the extremes, Successful Planners are more likely to be older, better paid, have better jobs or education, and have larger retirement savings than other segments. They are also the most likely to be active in managing and interacting with their accounts. These seem to include many of the characteristics of the "over-confident males" that Barber and O'Dean (2001) have analyzed (though in our survey, two thirds of the respondents were male and so it was not possible to differentiate the impact of gender on a statistically significant basis).
Table 4 here
At the other extreme, Live-for-Today Avoiders were more likely to be younger, lower paid, with manual or labor jobs and lower levels of education. Both Avoider categories were somewhat more likely to be minority rather than white; women were somewhat more prominent in the Stressed Avoider category.
In reviewing these results, several caveats should be kept in mind. First each segment is a statistical construct, and the boundaries are not precisely defined. Thus, individuals and typical demographic groups will not fir perfectly into a given category. Second, the results represent a snapshot in time, raising several interesting question of whether attitudes change over time and what factors could influence those changes. These remain for future research.
An important question raised by these segments is causality: do psychological states determine financial outcomes, or is it the other way around? For example, in the data there is a rough correlation between assets, income, age, and "planner" status. Is this because people who are older or who accumulate more assets become more motivated around appropriate financial attitudes and behavior, and so become more planner-like? Or is it that planners are more likely to be richer, given their vision of retirement, disciplined savings approach, and equity market orientation? Another way to restate this question is that, perhaps with sufficient time and resources, both financial and educational, most people actually become planners. However, for some groups of people, there is never sufficient time and resources. They come to realize the importance of planner attributes too late in their lives (if at all).
One critique of attitudinal segmentation studies is that, in the end, it is behavior that is relevant, not personal beliefs and attitudes. As long as individuals end up saving something, whether they express an interest in saving or other financial activities per se maybe immaterial.
Research on the adequacy of saving rates casts some doubt on the belief that workers are savings adequately in the first place. Moore and Mitchell (2000) note that about 40 percent of preretirees appearing to be ill-prepared to achieve some reasonable measure of retirement security.
Moreover, it is clear from the data we analyze that attitudes do matter and are linked to specific behavioral differences. Overall, participants with certain "desirable" sets of retirement saving attitudes do behave differently from other participants, in terms of plan participation, investment decisions, and engagement with their retirement plan account.
Implications of Money Attitudes
Our findings indicate that at least half of the plan population does not conform to a "planner" set of attitudes and expectations. Such a result has important implications for the ways in which retirement plans are designed. Here we highlight three: the degree of participant direction in retirement saving plans (and of employee choice in benefit packages broadly); the role of negative versus positive elections in plan design and public policy; and the design of financial education programs, both in the workplace and as part of a national campaign to promote financial literacy.
Degree of participant direction. Participant-directed pension plans are based on an implicit model of the "worker as planner", with each employees seen as a pro-active, engaged agents making fully-informed decisions about their financial futures. But the "money attitudes" research suggests that the "planner" model does not fit all.
If a large subset of the working population fails to take an active interest in retirement planning, retirement plans that rely on participants' voluntary decisions will be limited in their ability to assure retirement security. And unfortunately, a sizeable fraction of plan participants appears to have little or no interest in retirement planning or in plan participation. Yet this research does not suggest a retreat from plans relying on voluntary participant contributions and a shift to solely employer-funded plans. This is because in our sample, at least
half the population appears to have the attributes needed to optimize decisions in a participantcentric plan. Many others who are not classified as planners still do make voluntary contributions to a 401(k) plan. The question, it seems, is not whether public policy or employer plan design should take an "either-or" approach to participant-versus employer-direction in plan design. Rather, it is to what degree both types of plan designs should be encouraged in order to optimize the retirement system for workers with a variety of attitudinal types.
Our research also suggests that a limit on the number of choices offered to workers might make sense. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) raise questions about the demotivating effects of too much choice in the choice among consumer products, and Iyengar et al. (this volume) extend the choice research to retirement plans. This work underscores the fact that too much choice within a 401(k) plan can modestly reduce plan participation rates. While some choice is better than none, it is not at all clear that an ever-expanding set of choices is superior to a reasonable but small menu of choices. In the employee benefits world, choice is proliferating-in consumerdirected health care plans, in choice among types of retirement plan, and in proposed models for the reform of employee benefits law. 10 These models all rely on the success of a participantdirected DC plan as their reference point. Our research suggests that not all individuals with have the appropriate attitudes thought necessary to make successful decisions in such programs.
Negative elections and default choices-the "auto-pilot 401(k)." The behavioral economics literature cited earlier suggests a possible course of action, both in terms of policy and plan design, for addressing workers' varying "money attitudes." To address the fact that large groups of workers do not conform to the planner model of behavior, both policy and plan design could seek to encourage negative, rather than, positive choices-default outcomes, rather than pro-active decision-making.
Consider a possible reformulation of the traditional 401(k) plan along negative-decision lines. First, all eligible participants would be automatically enrolled in the workplace plan.
Because automatically enrolled participants remain at low savings rates, as Madrian and Shea (2001) have noted, participants' deferral rates would need to be increased automatically over time, using the Thaler and Benartzi (forthcoming) Save More Tomorrow concept. For workers who "opted out" of a savings program, there could be a provision for re-enrollment after a certain time in order to promote savings behavior on an ongoing basis. In terms of investment choices, fiduciary law might be amended to encourage sponsors to select diversified balanced portfolios, perhaps defined by current age, as default investment options. Alternatively, the law itself might include statutory definitions of default options, eliminating much of the employer decision-making and liability in the selection of investment defaults. We call this the "auto-pilot 401(k)" in which optimal savings and investment decisions occur by default, without the active engagement of the employee. Auto-pilot 401(k)s, in effect, attempt to reduce the degree of active decision-making in participant-directed plans for many workers, while preserving choice and flexibility for others.
Auto-pilot plan designs would come at some cost. Provider and employer administrative costs would rise, as many small accounts would be created through automatic enrollment.
Absent any change in plan design, employers would face additional costs for matching contributions for the newly enrolled participants who were previously non-participating. One way to offset some of those costs might be to make these automatic features an alternative to nondiscrimination testing. Nondiscrimination testing is designed to ensure that plans are not created exclusively to benefit high-paid workers, and that low-paid workers participate in sufficient numbers. Since automatic enrollment, automatic savings increases and age-based default balanced funds would likely achieve these same public policy goals, such a set of features could be a "safe harbor" alternative to traditional nondiscrimination testing.
The idea is that when a sizeable group of workers is disinterested in retirement and financial planning, plan design can be rethought so that doing nothing-being non-proactive, demovitated or uninterested when it comes to money and finances-can result in a near-optimal (if not optimal) retirement outcome as well.
Financial Literacy and Education. Current financial education programs in the workplace seem designed to meet the needs of Planners. Implicit in the delivery of extensive financial education materials is the idea of a motivated, interested audience. But our attitudinal segments reveal that at least half of the audience has a low level of interest in the topics addressed by such programs. Paradoxically, while education seems targeted at the Planner attitudinal segments, workplace education is only one source of financial information for them. They also turn to the general media, the Internet, financial publications, advisers, and others to make financial decisions.
Our results suggest that financial literacy programs, whether in the workplace or some other venue be refocused away from Planners, who are more naturally inclined to seek out many sources of financial information, and toward other attitudinal segments, where reliance on employer education is greater. This seems particularly true of enrollment materials.
Emphasizing the importance of retirement and providing extensive investment education in enrollment materials seem ideally suited to the interests of Successful or Up & Coming Planners (and possibly to sponsors and policymakers who are themselves Planners). Yet it runs exactly contrary to the present-day focus on Live-For-Today Avoiders, and it can even increase the level of financial complexity thought to be a hurdle to Stressed Avoiders.
Financial education could be redirected in three specific ways. First, education materials might increasingly focus on present-day benefits. Tangible benefits, such as matching contributions, or intangible benefits such as "making the most of your money today" or "avoiding financial confusion," are techniques to appeal attitudinally to non-Planners (Selnow, this volume) . Second, educational materials need to be vastly shortened simplified. NonPlanner audiences simply were not interested in an extensive tutorial on money management or retirement planning. And finally, education must be explicit and directive. Avoiders and even Secure Doers are not seem particularly interested in conceptual training in personal finance, while Planners will relish it (Vanguard, 2002c) . Indeed, for some participant segments, the "educational" model-in which educational activities result in specific attitudinal and behavioral changes-may no longer be suitable. For the non-Planer segments, a more suitable solution may be explicit savings and investment advice. Attitudinal segments may help improve the delivery of such advisory programs within defined contribution programs. Advice programs that require little effort or complex data-gathering are likely to appeal to Secure Doers and Avoiders.
Perhaps the ideal approach for this audience would be a default fund or managed 401(k) account, in which investment decisions are fully delegated to a third party or service provider.
Sophisticated advice capabilities on the internet, especially those that require active involvement, are probably better suited to Planners. Attitudinal issues may be one reason that complex internet tools have not been widely adopted by participants within retirement plans.
Conclusions
With the growth of voluntary, participant-directed DC saving plans, expectations for the types of decisions made by workers have also risen. Like experienced financial planners, workers are now expected to optimize a series of saving, investment, tax, and spending decisions throughout their working and retirement years. Yet participants' interests and attitudes towards important planning activities, like saving for the future, taking equity market risk, or developing a retirement plan, are quite heterogeneous. Only half of the retirement saver population can be thought of as possessing the "planner" characteristics needed to optimize retirement results in defined contribution plans, so the planner model does not fit all. The other half of the retirement plan population diverges from this "planner model" in important ways. We have identified five "money attitude" groups of workers-Successful Planners, Up & Coming Planners, Secure Doers, Stressed Avoiders, and Live-for-Today Avoiders-with distinct behavioral, demographic and attitudinal preferences toward money and retirement planning.
The existence of these attitudinal segments has important implications for public policy, retirement plan design and education and communications practices. First, it suggests a natural limit to the current model of participant direction, in which knowledgeable and motivated agents make well-informed choices about their future. A significant proportion of the population, it appears, is disinclined to be interested in the key activities or attitudes needed to make informed choices. While there may be educational or other techniques that will overcome this resistance, our research results suggest a tougher-than-anticipated road ahead for such efforts. Second, our research suggests that because not all participants are interested in making active and wellinformed financial choices, there may be a greater role for negative elections, default choices, investment advice, and managed 401(k) accounts-i.e., techniques designed to increase the level of "non-participant-direction" (or "other-person-direction") in participant-directed plans. Third, the results of this chapter suggest new approaches to financial education, with greater emphasis on simpler decisions, less information, reduced complexity and fewer choices. This new approach is applicable whether education is provided in the workplace or as part of a public campaign for financial literacy. * Workstage is defined as respondents' perception of the point they are in their working career. ↑/↓ indicates significantly higher or lower (participants versus non-participants) at the 95% confidence level. Note: Plan participants had an account balance of at least $100 in their Vanguard recordkeeping account. Non-participants were eligible for plan enrollment but non-participating. Source: Authors' computations. Notes: Eligible non-participants and participants were asked to rank each of the following statements on a scale of "1" to "10" where "10" means "strongly agree" and "1" means "strongly disagree." Statements were randomized; headings were for reference only and not read to the respondents. Shading illustrates highest response in each category.
Source: Authors' computations (13) Marriage rates among Successful Planners were statistically significantly higher; while both Avoiders had significantly lower rates of marriage. (14) There were no statistically significant differences in job or plan tenure, with the average person at their current company between 11 and 13 years, and the average participant in their employer's plan for 8-9 years. Source: Authors' computations assigned the mean response. Attitude statements were also centered within a respondent, by subtracting the mean score for an attitude from each respondent's score. Centering the data removes the "yea-sayers" and "nay-sayers" from the sample-individuals who always respond at the extremes of a scale.
